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State Amplification Subject To Masking
Constraints
O. Ozan Koyluoglu, Rajiv Soundararajan, and Sriram Vishwanath
Abstract
This paper considers a state dependent broadcast channel with one transmitter, Alice, and two receivers, Bob
and Eve. The problem is to effectively convey (“amplify”) the channel state sequence to Bob while “masking” it
from Eve. The extent to which the state sequence cannot be masked from Eve is referred to as leakage. This can be
viewed as a secrecy problem, where we desire that the channel state itself be minimally leaked to Eve while being
communicated to Bob. The paper is aimed at characterizing the trade-off region between amplification and leakage
rates for such a system. An achievable coding scheme is presented, wherein the transmitter transmits a partial state
information over the channel to facilitate the amplification process. For the case when Bob observes a stronger signal
than Eve, the achievable coding scheme is enhanced with secure refinement. Outer bounds on the trade-off region are
also derived, and used in characterizing some special case results. In particular, the optimal amplification-leakage rate
difference, called as differential amplification capacity, is characterized for the reversely degraded discrete memoryless
channel, the degraded binary, and the degraded Gaussian channels. In addition, for the degraded Gaussian model, the
extremal corner points of the trade-off region are characterized, and the gap between the outer bound and achievable
rate-regions is shown to be less than half a bit for a wide set of channel parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Problem Statement
In this paper, we consider a state dependent broadcast channel model with two users, and investigate the question
of to what extent the state of the channel can be amplified at the receiver (Bob) and masked from the other receiver
(referred to as Eve). The entire channel state sequence is presumed to be known non-causally to the transmitter
(Alice). The only manner to affect the state information at Bob and Eve is by the encoding scheme used at the
transmitter. For such a system, we aim to characterize the trade-off between the “amplification”-rate Ra (at which
the legitimate pair can operate) and the “leakage”-rate Rl (to the eavesdropper).
Formally, consider a discrete memoryless channel given by p(y, z|x, s), where x ∈ X is the channel input, s ∈ S
is the channel state, and (y, z) ∈ (Y ×Z) is the channel output. Here, y corresponds to the received channel output
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2Zn, Rl ≥
1
n
I(Sn; Zn)
Xn(Sn)
Encoder
Channel
p(y, z|x, s)
Sn ∼
∏
n
i=1
p(si)
Y n, Ra ≤
1
n
I(Sn; Y n)
Fig. 1. The system model for amplification subject to masking problem.
at the legitimate receiver (Bob) and z is the output at the eavesdropper (Eve). The channel is memoryless in the
sense that
p(Y n = yn, Zn = zn|Xn = xn, Sn = sn) =
n∏
i=1
p(yi, zi|xi, si),
and the state sequence Sn is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a probability distribution
indicated by p(s). It is assumed that the channel state sequence is non-causally known at the transmitter. The system
model is given in Fig 1.
The task of the encoder is to “amplify” the state sequence at Bob (channel output Y n) and to “mask” the state
sequence from Eve (Zn). Formally, the encoder Enc(Sn, n) is a mapping of channel state Sn to the channel input
Xn, i.e., Enc : Sn → Xn, which can be characterized by a conditional probability distribution p(xn|sn). (Ra, Rl)
is said to be achievable, if for any given ǫ > 0, there exist a sequence of encoders {Enc(Sn, n)} such that
1
n
I(Sn;Y n) ≥ Ra − ǫ (1)
1
n
I(Sn;Zn) ≤ Rl + ǫ (2)
for sufficiently large n, where the mutual information terms are with respect to the joint distribution p(sn, xn, yn, zn) =
p(xn|sn)
n∏
i=1
p(si)p(yi, zi|si, xi). The problem is to characterize all achievable (Ra,Rl) pairs, which we denote by
the trade-off region C.
The performance of the encoder is also quantified by measuring the difference between the achievable amplifi-
cation and leakage rates. The differential amplification rate Rd is said to be achievable if Rd = Ra −Rl for some
(Ra, Rl) ∈ C. The maximum value of the differential amplification rate is called as the differential amplification
capacity, denoted by Cd, where
Cd = sup
(Ra,Rl)∈C
Ra −Rl.
Note that this quantity is a property of a given trade-off region C and can play a role for some applications, as
this difference measures the knowledge difference between the two receivers regarding the state of the channel.
(This quantity, Cd, is discussed further in the later parts of the sequel.) In general, we are not only interested in the
knowledge difference, but also in the entire rate trade-off region, which constitutes the main focus of this paper.
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3A cost constraint may also be imposed on the channel input with
1
n
n∑
i=1
E{c(Xi)} ≤ C, (3)
where c : X → R+ defines the cost per input letter and the expectation is over the distribution of the channel input.
In this scenario, we say (Ra, Rl) is achievable under the cost function c(.) and at expected cost C, if there exists
a sequence of encoders satisfying (1), (2), and (3) in the limit of large n. (We use this constraint for the Gaussian
channel, where the cost is the average transmitted power.)
Finally, we note that the equivocation rate (denoted by ∆l) can be used in this formulation as well. In particular,
∆l is said to be achievable, if there exists a sequence of encoders satisfying
∆l ≤ 1
n
H(Sn|Zn) + ǫ,
for sufficiently large n. Accordingly, the achievable (Ra,∆l) pairs can be defined. Hence, the problem can be
re-formulated in terms of equivocation rate, where we seek to characterize all achievable (Ra,∆l) pairs in the limit
of large n. Since both the equivocation and leakage rate notions characterize the same trade-off, both notions can
be used interchangeably.
B. Related works and applications
The problem of communication over state dependent channels is studied by Gel’fand and Pinsker [1], where a
message has to be reliably transmitted over the channel with non-causal state knowledge at the transmitter. The
Gaussian version of the problem is solved in [2] through the famous dirty paper coding scheme. While the wiretap
channel is introduced and solved in [3], these results are extended to a broadcast setting in [4]. The problem of
sending secure messages over state dependent wiretap channels is studied in [5], [6].
On the other hand, the problems of state amplification and state masking are individually solved in [7], [8],
[9] for point-to-point channels. Both [7], [8] and [9] consider the problem of reliable transmission of messages in
addition to state amplification and state masking, respectively. In this paper, we consider the problem of amplifying
the state to a desired receiver while trying to minimize the leakage to (or mask the state from) the eavesdropper.
We note that, if we set Ra = 0 in our problem definition, it reduces to the state masking problem as studied in [9].
In other words,
Ra = 0
Rl = min
p(x|s) s.t. E{c(X)}≤C
I(S;Z)
can be shown to be achievable [9]. Also, when Rl ≥ H(S), the problem reduces to a state amplification problem
[8], and one can achieve the following rate pair.
Ra = min{H(S), max
p(x|s)
I(X,S;Y )}
Rl ≥ H(S)
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4These represent two extremes of the trade-off region between the amplification and masking rates. The main focus
of this paper is to characterize the entire trade-off region of amplification and leakage rates. In the following, we
list some applications of the proposed model.
1) Broadcast channels: Communication over state dependent channels have a wide set of applications in broadcast
channels, especially for the MIMO systems [10], [11], [12]. In such multi-user channels, an information-carrying
signal can be modeled as a state sequence for another. As the transmitter knows the information-carrying signal for
the first user, it can be treated as a known state for the transmission to the second user. In addition, the second signal
(intended for the second user) can be considered as an overlay to the first one, especially for multicasting scenarios.
(Here, the codeword of the first signal may follow an i.i.d. process, or this can be an uncoded information [9].)
In such multi-user settings, the security of the communication arise as an important problem due to the broadcast
nature of the medium. Utilizing the framework given in this paper, the amplification and leakage of the signals can
be analyzed.
2) Cognitive radio and relay channels: Another relevant setting where our results will be of significant interest
is cognitive radio systems [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. For example, in an overlay conginitive radio
scenario [16], the cognitive encoder (Alice) can facilitate the secure communication of the primary signal (the
state sequence of the channel) by amplifying the signal at the primary receiver (Bob) while masking it from the
eavesdropper (Eve). In such an application, the codebook information of the primary signal may be absent at the
cognitive radio, and the formulation we have in this paper would be relevant. More generally, this setting belongs
to user cooperation or relaying architectures that can increase the security of the communication systems [21], [22],
[23], [24]. In an another cognitive radio setup, two cognitive users (Alice and Bob) can utilize the primary signal
(interfering sequence Sn) to share a secret key between each other in the presence of an eavesdropper. (Applications
to key sharing from channel states are detailed in the following.)
3) Secret key generation from channel states: In recent years, a bridge between cryptography and information
theoretic security has emerged in the form of channel state-dependent key generation [25], [26], [27], [28]. In this
line of work, a state dependent channel (such as the wireless channel) is considered, and a function of this state
is intended to be a “shared secret” between the legitimate transmitter (Alice) and legitimate receiver (Bob) while
aiming to keep the eavesdropper (Eve) as much in the dark as possible. In the best case, the state(s) seen by Bob
and Eve will be completely different (independent). However, the states of the channels are usually dependent.
Moreover, for some models (e.g., the dirty paper coding setup [2]), there is a single channel state defining the
channel for both Bob and Eve. (For example, Y = X + S + NBob at Bob and Z = X + S + NEve at Eve as
considered in [29]. See also the discussion above for cognitive radio channels.) For such scenarios, as long as there
is a non-trivial difference between the amplification and leakage rates, the state knowledge can be used to develop
shared keys and enable cryptographic algorithms. For instance, utilizing the coding schemes proposed here, Bob
can have nRa bits of information regarding the channel state, where at most nRl number of these bits are leaked
to Eve. Then, privacy amplification [30] can be utilized to distill secret keys. That is, the methods provided in
this paper can be utilized for the “advantage distillation” phase of a key agreement protocol [30]. In this form, the
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5problem at hand is very much related to the generation of secrecy using sources and channels. Here, not only the
source in the model is the channel state (different from the models studied in [31], [32]), but also it is non-trivially
combined with the encoded signals of Alice (via the state dependent channel) to produce the observations at Bob
and Eve. Hence, our formulation can be closely associated with the problem of secret key agreement over state
dependent channels [33], [29]. In such problems, one is interested in the design of coding strategies that allow an
agreement of secure bits between the legitimate users utilizing the state dependent channel. For example, sending
secure bits over the channel will increase the secret key rate [29], [5], [6]. On the other hand, the problem studied in
this work, when specialized to the differential amplification measure, is an analysis of the channel state knowledge
difference. This analysis is very much related to the question of how many secret bits can be extracted from a given
channel state ([25], [26], [27], [28]). We intend to provide information-theoretic guarantees (achievable rates and
upper bounds) to the extent to which such a shared secret can be realized for our system model 1. Once obtained,
this shared secret can now be employed to seed numerous symmetric key cryptosystems [34], [35].
4) Watermarking and channel estimation: Consider that a host image S is utilized in a watermarking scenario,
where the encoder modifies the image in order to amplify it at the receiver Y and mask it from receiver Z . This
model is similar to channel estimation scenarios in wireless communications. For example, a pilot signal can be
constructed at the transmitter such that it not only facilitates the fading gain estimation at the receiver but also hides
the channel state from the eavesdroppers as much as possible. For instance, while communicating to a base station
for channel state estimation, a mobile user may want to hide this information from the external nodes in order to
establish privacy of her location.
C. Summary of results and organization
In this paper, we aim at developing an understanding of the trade-off between amplification and masking rates in
a state dependent broadcast channel through achievable regions and outer bounds, and characterizing special cases
when they match. The main results of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) Achievable Regions: The main achievability argument of the paper utilizes the transmission of a state dependent
message over the state dependent channel. To facilitate this, we construct a (Gel’fand-Pinsker) codebook, wherein
the corresponding codeword (denoted by Un) carry this refinement information in such a way that reliable communi-
cation can be achieved over the state-dependent channel. Subsequently, we utilize this refinement information within
a Wyner-Ziv coding scheme to derive expressions for the achievable amplification rates. In particular, we show that,
even though the side information is not generated in an i.i.d. fashion, Wyner-Ziv approach can be used to facilitate
amplification process. The leakage rates are then determined by deriving single-letter bounds on 1
n
I(Sn;Zn), and
the achievable regions are established over the input probability distributions p(u, x|s). The bounds show that the
1We note that differential amplification capacity is related to the secret key rate that can be achieved utilizing the corresponding channel state.
For example, consider Y = S1, Z = S2, where S1 and S2 are uniform bits. Here, Cd = 0 when the state is defined as S = [S1, S2], and
Cd = 1 when the state is taken as S1, implying that 1 bit of secret key rate can be supported.
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6rate of the refinement message not only increases the amplification rate Ra, but also increases the leakage rate Rl,
thereby establishing a trade-off for implementation.
2) Secure Refinement: We show that it is possible to extend the proposed region by transmitting secure refinement
information when Bob observes a “stronger” channel than Eve. In precise terms, this corresponds to instances of
p(u, x|s) satisfying I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z). Note that a channel is said to have a less noisy structure if I(U ;Y ) ≥
I(U ;Z) for all input probability distributions [36], [37]. We find that the utilization of the notion of secure refinement
approach is critical to such channels, and we show that the leakage due to transmission of the message can be
minimized by securing the message. In the process of establishing these results, we also develop an alternate proof
of secure message transmission over state dependent wiretap channels.
3) Special Classes of Channels: Our outer bound arguments are based on upper bounding 1
n
I(Sn;Y n) and
lower bounding 1
n
I(Sn;Zn). The achievable schemes and outer bounds presented are used to establish optimality
results for a class of channels. In particular, we show that the proposed scheme achieves the optimal differential
amplification capacity (i.e., the maximum value of Ra − Rl over the set of achievable (Ra, Rl) pairs) for the
reversely degraded discrete memoryless channel (DMC), the degraded binary channel, and the degraded Gaussian
channel.
4) Gaussian Channels: We characterize the corner points of the region for the degraded Gaussian channel. In this
scenario, we further bound the gap between achievable and converse regions, and show the following: Let us denote
the message capacity of Bob’s channel as Cb = 12 log(1+SNRb) and that of Eve’s channel as Ce =
1
2 log(1+SNRe),
where SNRb (SNRe) is the signal-to-noise ratio of Bob (respectively, Eve). Then, for any given leakage rate Rl, we
show that the gap between the upper and lower bounds on the amplification rate Ra is bounded by Cb. Similarly,
for any given amplification rate Ra, we show that the achievable leakage rate is within Ce of the lower bound on
Rl. In particular, the corresponding gaps are within half a bit when SNRb ≤ 1 and SNRe ≤ 1, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II details the proposed coding schemes and presents the
corresponding achievable regions. Section III provides the outer bounds to the trade-off region. Section IV includes
optimality discussions and numerical results for special classes of DMCs including the reversely degraded channel,
modulo additive binary channel model, and the memory with defective cells model. The Gaussian channel model is
considered in Section V along with corresponding optimality results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
Some of the proofs are collected in appendices to improve the flow of the paper.
II. ACHIEVABLE REGIONS
We consider transmitting state dependent information over the state dependent channel. This refinement infor-
mation can be utilized at Bob in resolving some ambiguity regarding the channel state. We divide the discussion
into two parts, each providing a different scheme for the transmission of this refinement information.
A. State enhanced messaging: Refinement
In order to facilitate the transmission of information regarding the state sequence, we consider an encoder that
transmits a state dependent message over the state dependent channel. Here, by employing the Gel’fand-Pinsker
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7coding [1], a rate of I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) can be reliably communicated over the state dependent channel. Utilizing
this communication rate, Alice can provide a refinement information to Bob. In particular, we consider a Wyner-Ziv
coding [38] approach to provide such a refinement information (as discussed in [8]). Here, the side information
at the receiver is (Un, Y n) - consisting of Gel’fand-Pinsker codeword Un and the observed sequence from the
channel Y n. For this side information scenario, we utilize the Gel’fand-Pinsker information rate as the bin index of
a covering codeword V n. We note that, in the original setup of source coding with side information (aka Wyner-Ziv
model), the side information is generated i.i.d. with the source sequence. For the scenario considered here, the side
information is not in this form. In the following, we show that this issue can be resolved, and the Wyner-Ziv coding
scheme can be utilized to increase the amplification rate. On the other hand, this transmission scheme may leak
some state information to Eve. Accordingly, we obtain appropriate bounds on the leakage rate that depends on the
Gel’fand-Pisker coding rate used for the refinement. The corresponding achievable region is given by the following.
Theorem 1: [Refinement] Let R1 be the closure of the union of all (Ra, Rl) pairs satisfying
Ra ≤ I(S;Y, U) +Rr
Rl ≥ min
{
I(U, S;Z), I(S;Z,U) +Rr
}
Rr ≤ min{I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S), H(S|Y, U)},
over all distributions p(u, x|s) satisfying I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S). Then, R1 ⊆ C.
1) Proof of Theorem 1: We provide main steps of the coding argument here and relegate some of the details to
appendices.
Codebook Generation: Fix a p(u|s) and a p(v|s). (The requirement on these distributions will be specified
later.) Randomly and independently generate 2nRv sequences V n(l), l ∈ [1, 2nRv ], each according to ∏ni=1 pV (vi).
Partition indices l into equal-size subsets referred to as bins B(b) = [(b − 1)2n(Rv−Rr) + 1 : b2n(Rv−Rr)],
b ∈ [1 : 2nRr ]. (This is the codebook used for Wyner-Ziv coding [38], [39].) For each m ∈ [1 : 2nRm ], generate
2n(Ru−Rm) number of Un sequences randomly and independently according to
∏n
i=1 pU (ui). Index these sequences
as Un(m, k) with k ∈ [1 : 2n(Ru−Rm)]. (This is the codebook used for Gel’fand-Pinsker coding [1], [39].)
Encoding: Here, the encoder sets Rm = Rr and m = b and transmits message b of rate Rr with Gel’fand-
Pinsker coding in order to perform refinement via Wyner-Ziv coding. Given sn, the encoder finds an index l such
that (sn, vn(l)) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ . If there exists more than one index, it selects one uniformly random among these. If there
exists no such index, it selects one uniformly random from [1, 2nRv ]. From l, encoder determines the bin index b in
the V n codebook such that l ∈ B(b). Then, it sets m = b and finds an index k such that (sn, u(n)(m, k)) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ .
If no such (covering) index k exists or if there are more than one, the encoder picks one uniformly at random. The
encoder then transmits xn that is generated i.i.d. according to
∏n
i=1 pX|U,S(xi|ui(m, k), si).
Amplification rate analysis: In the following, we show that the decoder can obtain Un codeword using Gel’fand-
Pinsker decoding and then V n codeword by utilizing the side information (Un, Y n). (This is the discussion provided
in [8] for a state amplification mechanism, which we detail here.) We then provide a derivation of the state
amplification rate utilizing this decoding mechanism.
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8Let ǫ > ǫ′′ > ǫ′. Upon receiving yn, decoder declares that mˆ ∈ [1 : 2nRr ] and kˆ ∈ [1 : 2n(Ru−Rr)] are chosen
at the encoder, if these are the unique indices such that (un(mˆ, kˆ), yn) ∈ T (n)ǫ , otherwise it declares an error.
(We remark that compared to the Gel’fand-Pinsker setup [1], [39], where only the message m has to be uniquely
decoded, we require decoder to obtain the codeword un chosen at the encoder. This will be utilized in decoding error
analysis.) Then, the decoder finds the unique index lˆ ∈ B(mˆ) such that (vn(lˆ), un(mˆ, kˆ), yn) ∈ T (n)ǫ . Otherwise,
it declares an error.
Consider the error event E = {Mˆ 6= M, Kˆ 6= K, Lˆ 6= L}, where (K,L,M) are the indices chosen at the
transmitter, and (Kˆ, Lˆ, Mˆ) are the indices decoded at the receiver. Decoder makes an error only if one or more of
the following events occur.
E1 = {(Un(M,k), Sn) /∈ T (n)ǫ′ for all k}
E2 = {(Un(M,K), Y n) /∈ T (n)ǫ }
E3 = {(Un(m, k), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ for some m 6= M}
E4 = {(Un(M,k), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ for some k 6= K}
E5 = {(V n(l), Sn) /∈ T (n)ǫ′ for all l}
E6 = {(V n(L), Sn, Un(M,K), Y n) /∈ T (n)ǫ }
E7 = {(V n(l), Un(M,K), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ for some l 6= L, l ∈ B(M)}
Here, E = ∪7j=1Ej . By the union of events bound, we have
Pr{E} ≤ Pr{E1}+ Pr{Ec1 ∩ E2}+ Pr{E3}+ Pr{Ec3 ∩ E4}+ Pr{E5}+ Pr{Ec1 ∩ Ec5 ∩ E6}+ Pr{E7}.
We bound each term above in the following.
a) By covering lemma [39], Pr{E1} → 0 as n→∞, if
Ru −Rm > I(U ;S) + δ(ǫ′). (4)
b) Ec1 implies that (Un(M,K), Sn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ , which implies that (Un(M,K), Sn, Xn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′′ due to i.i.d.
generation of xi from (si, ui) and the conditional typicality lemma [39] for some ǫ′′ > ǫ′. Similarly, as Y n is
generated i.i.d. from (si, ui, xi) through (si, xi), we have Pr{Ec1 ∩E2} → 0 as n→∞ for some ǫ > ǫ′′, again due
to the conditional typicality lemma [39].
c) Each Un(m, k) for some m 6= M is distributed i.i.d.
n∏
i=1
pU (ui) and independent of Y n. By packing
lemma [39], we have Pr{E3} → 0 as n→∞, if
Ru < I(U ;Y )− δ(ǫ). (5)
The three error analyses above are the same arguments used for decoding the message index in Gel’fand-Pinsker
coding [1], [39].
d) The analysis for showing that Pr{Ec3 ∩ E4} → 0 as n→∞ is detailed in Appendix A. We use the arguments
given in [40] in order to show this. The original problem studied in [40] does not involve a state-dependent channel,
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9but the coding scheme constructs channel inputs via x(u, s), which can be viewed as a state dependent channel.
(The argument we have here - the Gel’fand-Pinsker codeword decoded at the decoder is the same as the one chosen
at the encoder - also appears in [41], which states that this observation follows from the arguments in [40], [42].)
e) By covering lemma [39], Pr{E5} → 0 as n→∞, if
Rv > I(S;V ) + δ(ǫ
′). (6)
f) For analyzing Pr{Ec1 ∩ Ec5 ∩ E6}, we note that one may not utilize conditional typicality lemma as done in
the proof of Wyner-Ziv coding (see, e.g., [39, Section 11.3.1]). Because, the side information here, (Un, Y n), is
not generated i.i.d. through pU,Y |S(ui, yi|si). Therefore, one can not go from joint typicality of (V n(L), Sn) to the
joint typicality of (V n(L), Sn, Un(M,K), Y n). Instead, we consider the following approach: Ec5 implies that
(V n(L), Sn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ , (7)
and Ec1 implies that (Un(M,K), Sn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ . Now, consider a pair (vn, sn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ . In addition, we have
Pr{Un(M,K) = un|Sn = sn, V n(L) = vn} = Pr{Un(M,K) = un|Sn = sn} such that the pmf p(un|sn)
satisfies the following two conditions: The first condition is that
lim
n→∞Pr{(s
n, Un(M,K)) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ (S,U)} = 1, (8)
which is due to the fact that probability of the Ec1 event vanishes. And, the second condition is that, for every
un ∈ T (n)ǫ′ (U |sn) and for sufficiently large n,
2−n(H(U|S)+δ(ǫ
′)) ≤ p(un|sn) ≤ 2−n(H(U|S)−δ(ǫ′)) (9)
for some δ(ǫ′)→ 0 as ǫ′ → 0. This second assertion, i.e., (9), follows from [39, Lemma 12.3]. Now, from (7), (8),
(9), and the fact that V → S → U forms a Markov chain, we obtain from Markov lemma [39] that, for some ǫ′′ > ǫ′,
lim
n→∞
Pr{V n(L), Sn, Un(M,K) ∈ T (n)ǫ′′ |V n(L) = vn, Sn = sn} = 1. Denoting E˜6 = {V n(L), Sn, Un(M,K) /∈
T (n)ǫ′′ }, the analysis above implies that Pr{Ec1∩Ec5∩E˜6} → 0 as n→∞. (We note that, an analysis similar to the one
above is given for the Berger-Tung inner bound in [39]. The difference here is that the bin index of the covering code-
word V n determines the M index of Un. Still, given a realization of vn, and hence m, we have covering sequences,
i.e., the set {Un(m, k)}|2n(Ru−Rr)k=1 , for sn, from which the argument follows.) Then, by conditional typicality
lemma [39], for some ǫ > ǫ′′, we have (V n(L), Sn, Un(M,K), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ , as (V n(L), Sn, Un(M,K)) ∈ T (n)ǫ′′
(due to having Ec1 ∩ Ec5 ∩ E˜6 w.h.p.), and Y n|(V n(L) = vn, Sn = sn, Un(M,K) = un) ∼
n∏
i=1
pY |U,S(yi|ui, si).
This implies that Pr{Ec1 ∩ Ec5 ∩ E6} → 0 as n→∞.
g) Finally, Pr{E7} analysis follows as that for the proof of Wyner-Ziv coding (see, e.g., [39, Section 11.3.1]). In
particular, considering the event E˜7 = {(V n(l), Un(M,K), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ for some l ∈ B(1),M 6= 1}, [39, Lemma
11.1] shows that Pr{E7} ≤ Pr{E˜7}. Then, as each V n(l) with l ∈ B(1) is generated by
n∏
i=1
pV (vi) and independent
of (Un(M,K), Y n), from packing lemma [39], Pr{E˜7} → 0 as n→∞, if
Rv −Rr < I(V ;U, Y )− δ(ǫ). (10)
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Therefore, Pr{E7} → 0 as n→∞, if (10) holds.
The analysis above implies that Pr{E} → 0 as n → ∞ if (4), (5), (6), and (10) hold. Here, we set Rm = Rr
and Ru − Rr = I(U ;S) + δ1 and Rv = I(V ;S) + δ2, for some arbitrarily small δ1 and δ2. This will satisfy (4)
and (6). Furthermore, we set Rr = I(V ;S)− I(V ;U, Y ) + δ2 = I(V ;S|U, Y ) + δ2, which is the rate required to
describe V n to the decoder. This will satisfy (10). Finally, for a given p(u|s), we choose some p(v|s) to support
transmission of the refinement message b = m with rate Rr = Rm < I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)− δ1. This will satisfy (5),
as Ru = Rr + (I(U ;S) + δ1) < I(U ;Y ). We note that, Rr ≤ H(S|U, Y ) + δ2 as I(V ;S|U, Y ) ≤ H(S|U, Y ) in
above. Therefore, for a given p(u|s), the proposed coding scheme supports any state refinement rate Rr satisfying
Rr ≤ min{I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S), H(S|U, Y )}.
Utilizing the analysis above, we now detail the derivation of the amplification rate. We start by defining an event
indicator random variable E. Consider setting E = 1, if a decoding error (E) occurs or the state sequence observed
at the encoder (Sn) turns out to be non-typical. Set E = 0, otherwise. We continue with the following set of
relations. (We drop the indicies of codewords.)
1
n
I(Sn;Y n)
(a)
≥ 1
n
I(Sn;Y n|E)− 1
n
=
1
n
I(Sn;Y n|E = 0)Pr{E = 0}+ 1
n
I(Sn;Y n|E = 1)Pr{E = 1} − 1
n
(b)
≥ 1
n
I(Sn;Y n|E = 0)Pr{E = 0} − 1
n
(c)
=
1
n
I(Sn;Y n, Un, V n|E = 0)(1− Pr{E = 1})− 1
n
(d)
≥ 1
n
I(Sn;Y n, Un, V n|E = 0)− (H(S) + ǫ1) Pr{E = 1})− 1
n
(e)
≥ (H(S)− ǫ1)− 1
n
H(Sn|Y n, Un, V n, E = 0)− ǫ2
(f)
≥ (H(S)− ǫ1)−H(S|Y, U, V )− ǫ2
(g)
= I(S;Y, U) +Rr − (ǫ1 + ǫ2 + δ2),
where (a) follows by the indicator event conditioning lemma given in Appendix B, (b) follows as I(Sn;Y n|E =
1) ≥ 0, (c) is due to the definition of E, wherein E = 0 implies that Ec, i.e., the decodability of the codewords
(Un(M,K), V n(L)) form Y n, (d) is by I(Sn;Y n, Un, V n|E = 0) ≤ H(Sn|Y n, Un, V n, E = 0) ≤ H(Sn|E =
0) ≤ n(H(S)+ǫ1) for some arbitrarily small ǫ1 as E = 0 implies that Sn is typical (and Sn is generated i.i.d. here),
(e) is by taking ǫ2 = (H(S)+ǫ1) Pr{E = 1})− 1n , which can be made arbitrarily small as n→∞ (as Pr{E = 1} →
0 as n→∞), and lower bounding H(Sn|E = 0) ≥ n(H(S)−ǫ1), which follows as E = 0 implies that Sn is typical
(and Sn is generated i.i.d. here), (f) follows as H(Sn|Y n, Un, V n, E = 0) =
n∑
i=1
H(Si|Si−11 , Y n, Un, V n, E =
0) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Si|Yi, Ui, Vi) = n(H(S|Y, U, V )), and (g) is by H(S)−H(S|Y, U, V ) = I(S;Y, U, V ) = I(S;Y, U)+
I(S;V |Y, U) = I(S;Y, U) + Rr − δ2. (This follows, as we set Rr = I(S;V |Y, U) + δ2 in the coding scheme.)
From the last expression, we identify that any Ra ≤ I(S;Y, U) +Rr is achievable.
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Leakage rate analysis: We first show the achievability of Rl ≥ I(U, S;Z) with the following.
1
n
I(Sn;Zn) ≤ 1
n
I(Un, Sn;Zn)
=
1
n
H(Zn)− 1
n
H(Zn|Un, Sn)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Zi−11 )−
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Zi−11 , Un, Sn)
(a)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Zi)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Ui, Si)
(b)
= I(U, S;Z),
where (a) follows as H(Zi|Zi−11 ) ≤ H(Zi) due to the fact that conditioning does not increase the entropy and
H(Zi|Zi−11 , Un, Sn) = H(Zi|Ui, Si) as (Zi−11 , U i−11 , Si−11 , Uni+1, Sni+1) → (Ui, Si) → Zi forms a Markov chain
(this is due to i.i.d. generation of xi from (ui, si), and i.i.d. generation of zi from (xi, si)), and (b) follows as
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Ui, Si;Zi) = I(U, S;Z). (We note that single letterization argument for H(Zn|Un, Sn) above is also given
in (26) of [9].)
Next, we focus on the achievability of Rl ≥ I(S;Z,U) +Rr. We have the following.
1
n
I(Sn;Zn) ≤ 1
n
I(Un(M,K), Sn;Zn)
(a)
=
1
n
I(Un(M,K),M ;Zn) +
1
n
I(Sn;Zn|Un(M,K))
(b)
≤ 1
n
H(M) +
1
n
H(Un(M,K)|M) + 1
n
I(Sn;Zn|Un(M,K))
=
1
n
H(M) +
1
n
H(Un(M,K)|M) + 1
n
H(Zn|Un(M,K))− 1
n
H(Zn|Un(M,K), Sn)
(c)
≤ Rr + I(U ;S) + δ1 +H(Z|U)−H(Z|U, S)
= I(S;Z,U) +Rr + δ1,
where (a) is by adding I(M ;Zn|Un(M,K)) = 0 as M can be determined from Un(M,K) for a given codebook,
(b) follows as I(Un(M,K),M ;Zn) ≤ H(Un(M,K),M) = H(M) + H(Un(M,K)|M), (c) is due to having
H(M) ≤ nRr (a random variable with 2nRr values has entropy at most nRr), H(Un(M,K)|M) ≤ n(Ru−Rr) =
n(I(U ;S) + δ1) (here, given M , there are 2n(Ru−Rr) number of Un codewords, and the entropy of this set is
maximized if the index K has the uniform distribution), H(Zn|Un) =
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Zi−11 , Un) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Ui) =
nH(Z|U), and having H(Zn|Un, Sn) =
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Zi−11 , Un, Sn) =
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Ui, Si) = nH(Z|U, S), where the
second inequality holds as (Zi−11 , U
i−1
1 , S
i−1
1 , U
n
i+1, S
n
i+1)→ (Ui, Si)→ Zi forms a Markov chain (as detailed in
the previous paragraph). (We note that single letterization arguments for H(Zn|Un) and H(Zn|Un, Sn) above are
also given in (24) and (26) of [9].)
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1, where we take the union of the achievable pairs over all p(u|s) ×
p(x|u, s) = p(u, x|s) distributions.
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2) Message transmission: We note that it is possible to allocate a part of the Gel’fand-Pinsker coding rate in the
scheme proposed above in order to transmit messages. In particular, if (Ra, Rl, Rr) satisfies the inequalities given
in Theorem 1, then (Ra, Rl, Rm) is achievable with a message rate of Rm = I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;S) − Rr. That is,
the Gel’fand-Pinsker coding rate given by I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) can be divided into refinement rate Rr and message
rate Rm.
3) State sequence covering: In the region given by Theorem 1, increasing Rr will not only increase the
amplification rate but will also increase the leakage rate. Therefore, for some scenarios, implementing only a
covering scheme might be advantageous. By choosing an arbitrarily small refinement rate Rr in Theorem 1, the
following region can be achieved.
Corollary 2: [Covering] Let R2 be the closure of the union of all (Ra, Rl) pairs satisfying
Ra ≤ I(S;Y, U)
Rl ≥ min
{
I(U, S;Z), I(S;Z,U)
}
over all distributions p(u, x|s) satisfying I(U ;Y ) > I(U ;S). Then, R2 ⊆ C.
We note that the rate of refinement, Rr = I(V ;S|U, Y ) + δ2, is set to an arbitrarily small value here, and the
codeword V n only serves as a covering of the state sequence. Further implications of this covering scheme on
the amplification-leakage region is discussed in Section IV-A. We note that, by transmission of a covering of the
state, the leakage rate is shown to satisfy Rl ≥ min
{
I(U, S;Z), I(S;Z,U)
}
. Remarkably, one can guarantee such
a bound, even if some state dependent information is transmitted over the channel. In particular, if the channel
seen by Bob is stronger than the one seen by Eve, one can send the refinement information securely over the state
dependent channel. This approach is detailed in the next section.
B. Secure refinement
Consider all input distributions p(u, x|s) satisfying I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z). For such distributions, it is possible to
send refinement information securely over the channel. This way, the leakage increase due to refinement index is
decreased as the security of the index will lower the corresponding leakage rate achieved at Eve compared to the
non-secured case. In the following, we first focus on transmission of secure messages over the state dependent
channel, and then detail the proposed secure refinement approach.
1) Secure message transmission over state dependent channels: Consider that a transmitter wants to send a
secure message M over the state dependent channel in the presence of eavesdropper. This problem is studied in [5],
and, we will revisit it here. In particular, we give a codebook construction and provide a lemma that upper bounds
I(M ;Zn), the leakage to the eavesdropper 2. This result is then utilized in the following part, in showing the
proposed secure refinement approach.
2The codebook we provide here is a special case of the one proposed in [5], which considers an extended version for an equivocation rate
analysis.
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Codebook Generation: We divide the codebook construction in two parts, depending on whether I(U ;Z) >
I(U ;S) or not. If I(U ;Z) > I(U ;S), generate 2nRu codewords Un(M,T,K), where M ∈ [1 : 2nRm ], K ∈ [1 :
2n(I(U ;S)+δ)], and T ∈ [1 : 2n(Ru−Rm−I(U ;S)−δ)]. Here, T is randomly selected. We set Rm = I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
and Ru = I(U ;Y ) − δ, which imply H(T ) = n(I(U ;Z) − I(U ;S)− 2δ). If I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;S), generate 2nRu
codewords Un(M,K), where M ∈ [1 : 2nRm ], K ∈ [1 : 2n(I(U ;S)+δ)]. We set Rm = I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)− 2δ and
Ru = I(U ;Y ) − δ. In both cases, M is the secure message index, and K is used as a covering index (similar to
the previous section).
The above codebook construction is the same as that of Gel’fand-Pinsker codebook (described in the previous
section), with the only difference being that, for probability distributions satisfying I(U ;Z) > I(U ;S), we select a
part of the message as random (represented as T in the paragraph above). This enables to argue that the remaining
part of the Gel’fand-Pinsker message (represented as M in the paragraph above) is secure against the eavesdropper
(in terms of the leakage rate). We have the following.
Lemma 3: For the codebook generation given above, for some ǫ→ 0 as n→∞,
I(M ;Zn) ≤ nI(S;Z,U) +H(Sn|Un, Zn)−H(Sn|M,T ) + nǫ,
where T is a random variable uniformly distributed on the set [1 : 2n(I(U ;Z)−I(U ;S)−2δ)] for I(U ;Z) > I(U ;S),
and T = ∅ for I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;S).
Proof: See Appendix C.
This result is utilized in the next section for the secure refinement approach. Here, we note the following corollary,
which is an alternate proof of security in state dependent wiretap channels.
Corollary 4: For the codebook generation given above, if M is independent of Sn, then
1
n
I(M ;Zn) ≤ ǫ,
for some ǫ→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof: See Appendix D.
2) Secure refinement via secure and state dependent message transmission: In the previous section, a refinement
approach is proposed where a Gel’fand-Pinsker coded message is utilized to resolve some ambiguity regarding
the channel state at Bob. In such an approach, the message rate is utilized as the bin index of a covering (V n)
codebook. (See proof of Theorem 1.) Here, we consider transmission of this refinement message securely to Bob
by utilizing the codebook construction given above. As the message rate is modified from I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;S)
to secure message rate I(U ;Y ) −max{I(U ;S), I(U ;Z)}, this modification results in a refinement rate of Rr ≤
min
{
I(U ;Y )−max{I(U ;S), I(U ;Z)}, H(S|Y, U)}. However, the leakage rate due refinement is now independent
of Rr. The corresponding region is given by the following.
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Theorem 5: Let R3 be the closure of the union of all (Ra, Rl) pairs satisfying
Ra ≤ I(S;Y, U) +Rr
Rl ≥ min{I(U, S;Z), I(S;Z,U)}
Rr ≤ min
{
I(U ;Y )−max{I(U ;S), I(U ;Z)}, H(S|Y, U)}
over all distributions p(u, x|s) satisfying I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S) Then, R3 ⊆ C.
Note that, the amplification rate that can be obtained with such an approach is lower than the previous case
(Theorem 1), as the message rate Rr ≤ I(U ;Y )−I(U ;Z) < I(U ;Y )−I(U ;S) if I(U ;Z) > I(U ;S). Therefore, the
improvement on the leakage expression compared to Theorem 1 is obtained with a degradation on the amplification
rate.
Proof: We use the codebook generation given above. The only difference compared to the codebook construction
utilized in the proof of Theorem 1 is that part of the message (i.e., T ) is selected as random when I(U ;Z) > I(U ;S).
Therefore, the amplification rate analysis is the same as that of the one given in the proof of Theorem 1 with
Rr bounded by Rr ≤ I(U ;Y ) − max{I(U ;S), I(U ;Z)} instead of Rr ≤ I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;S). The proof of
Rl ≥ I(U, S;Z) follows from the same steps given in the proof of Theorem 1. Here, we show that Rl ≥ I(S;Z,U)
holds as well.
Consider the following.
I(Sn;Zn) ≤ I(M,Sn;Zn)
= I(M ;Zn) + I(Sn;Zn|M)
(a)
≤ [nI(S;Z,U) +H(Sn|Un, Zn)−H(Sn|M,T ) + nǫ] +H(Sn|M)−H(Sn|M,Zn)
= nI(S;Z,U) + nǫ+H(Sn|Un, Zn)−H(Sn|M,Zn) +H(Sn|M)−H(Sn|M,T )
(b)
≤ nI(S;Z,U) + nǫ+ I(Sn;T |M)
(c)
= nI(S;Z,U) + nǫ,
where (a) follows from Lemma 3, (b) follows as H(Sn|Un, Zn) = H(Sn|Un,M,Zn) ≤ H(Sn|M,Zn) and
H(Sn|M) − H(Sn|M,T ) = I(Sn;T |M), and (c) follows by observing I(Sn;T |M) = 0, where T = ∅ for
I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;S); and, T is independently generated random variable for I(U ;Z) > I(U ;S), implying that
H(T |M) = H(T |M,Sn) = H(T ). As ǫ can be made arbitrarily small, we conclude from last expression that any
Rl ≥ I(S;Z,U) is achievable.
III. OUTER BOUNDS
In this section, we provide outer bounds on the achievable amplification-leakage rate region. In particular, we
derive regions denoted by Ro, to which any achievable (Ra, Rl) must belong.
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Proposition 6: If (Ra, Rl) is achievable, then (Ra, Rl) ∈ R1o, where R1o is the closure of the union of all (Ra, Rl)
pairs satisfying
Ra ≤ min {H(S), I(X,S;Y )}
Rl ≥ I(S;Z,U)
over all p(u, x|s) distributions satisfying I(U ;Z) ≥ I(U ;S).
Proof: See Appendix E.
If the channel is degraded, wherein p(y, z|x, s) = p(y|x, s)p(z|y), the following outer bound can be obtained.
Proposition 7: If the channel satisfies p(y, z|x, s) = p(y|x, s)p(z|y) and if (Ra, Rl) is achievable, then (Ra, Rl) ∈
R2o, where R2o is the closure of the union of all (Ra, Rl) pairs sarisfying
Ra ≤ min {H(S), I(X,S;Y )}
Rl ≥ I(S;Z,U)
Ra −Rl ≤ I(X,S;Y |Z)
over all p(u, x|s) distributions satisfying I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S).
Proof: See Appendix F.
These outer bound regions are used in the following to establish special case results.
IV. SPECIAL DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CHANNEL MODELS
A. Reversely degraded DMCs
We say that the channel is reversely degraded if (X,S) → Z → Y forms a Markov Chain. Note that, this
corresponds to a stronger channel seen by Eve compared to that of Bob. Therefore, reversely degraded scenarios
imply Cd ≤ 0, meaning that the state knowledge at Bob is not higher than that of at Eve. We have the following
result for this set of channels.
Theorem 8: The optimal differential amplification rate for reversely degraded DMCs is given by
Cd = max
p(x|s)
I(S;Y )− I(S;Z)
Proof: Achievability of the stated difference follows from Theorem 1 by substituting U = ∅. We provide the
converse in Appendix G.
Note that coding can not improve this difference as the channel is reversely degraded. Thus, coding might help
to increase Ra at the expense of possibly decreasing Ra −Rl for the reversely degraded scenario. This is also the
case for the covering scheme given by Corollary 2. That is, Ra vs. Ra−Rl can be traded-off using different input
distributions. (U = ∅ case will correspond to the maximum Ra −Rl, and achieve Cd.)
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B. Modulo additive binary model
Consider the channels given by
Yi = Xi ⊕ Si ⊕Ni
Zi = Xi ⊕ Si ⊕ N˜i,
where the state and noise distributions are generated i.i.d. as Si ∼ Bern(ps), Ni ∼ Bern(pn), N˜i ∼ Bern(pnz ). (All
pks satisfy pk ∈ [0, 0.5] for k ∈ {s, n, nz}.) In this section, we use the following notation for the binary convolution
p⊗ q , p(1− q) + q(1− p).
1) State cancellation scheme: To cancel the state from the channel, we send
Xi = Ui ⊕ Si,
where Ui ∼ Bern(pu) and the codewords Un carry a description of the state sequence Sn. This way, we achieve
the following inner-bound.
Corollary 9: The state cancellation scheme, which sends Bern(pu) distributed signal XORed with state sequence
at each time instant, achieves the set of (Ra, Rl) pairs denoted by the region RSC, where
RSC = Convex Hull


⋃
pu∈[0,0.5],pu⊗ps≤0.5
(Ra(pu), Rl(pu))

 ⊆ C,
with
Ra(pu) ≤ min {H(ps), H(pu ⊗ pn)−H(pn)}
Rl(pu) ≥ H(pu ⊗ pnz )−H(pnz ).
Proof: Achievability follows from Corollary 2.
2) Optimal differential amplification rate:
Corollary 10: If pn ≤ pnz and H(ps) ≥ 1 −H(pn) for a binary model, the optimal amplification and leakage
rate difference is given by
Cd = H(pnz)−H(pn).
Proof: From Proposition 7, we obtain the following. If pn ≤ pnz , any given (Ra, Rl) ∈ C satisfies
Ra −Rl ≤ H(pnz )−H(pn) + max
p(x|s)
{H(X ⊕ S ⊕N)−H(X ⊕ S ⊕Nz)} .
Note that, this upper-bound can be evaluated by observing
max
p(x|s)
{H(X ⊕ S ⊕N)−H(X ⊕ S ⊕Nz)}
= max
p(x|s)
{H(X ⊕ S ⊕N)−H(X ⊕ S ⊕N ⊕N∗z )}
≤ max
p(x|s)
{H(X ⊕ S ⊕N)−H(X ⊕ S ⊕N ⊕N∗z |N∗z )}
= 0,
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Fig. 2. Channel model of memory with defective cells. p = Pr{S = 0} (probability of being stuck at 0), q = Pr{S = 1} (probability of being
stuck at 1), r = Pr{S = 2} (probability of being in a noiseless state), and N ∼ Bern(n), where n ∈ [0, 0.5] is the cross over probability of
the BSC from Y to Z .
where the equality is due to the channel degradedness condition with appropriate noise term N∗z independent of
N such that N ⊕ N∗z = Nz , and the inequality is due to the fact that conditioning does not increase the entropy.
Using this we observe that the outer-bound is maximized with a choice of p(x) = 0.5, which evaluates to
Ra −Rl ≤ H(pnz )−H(pn).
This expression is achieved by Corollary 9, when we choose p(u) = 0.5, if H(ps) ≥ 1−H(pn).
C. Memory with defective cells model
We consider the model of information transmission over write-once memory device with stuck-at defective
cells [43], [44], [45]. In this channel model, each memory cell corresponds to a channel state instant with cardinality
|S| = 3, where the binary channel output is determined from the binary channel input and the channel state as:
p(y = 0|x, s = 0) = 1
p(y = 1|x, s = 1) = 1
p(y = x|x, s = 2) = 1,
where Pr{S = 0} = p is the probability that the channel is stuck at 0, Pr{S = 1} = q is the probability that
the channel is stuck at 1, and Pr{S = 2} = r is the probability of having a good channel where y = x with
p+ q + r = 1. We consider a binary symmetric channel (BSC) from Y to Z , where
Zi = Yi ⊕Ni,
with Ni ∼ Bern(n) for some n ∈ [0, 0.5]. This corresponds to a degraded DMC model. (See Fig. 2.)
We present numerical results for this channel model with three regions: Uncoded region, coded region, and an
outer-bound region. The uncoded region is obtained by setting U = ∅ in Theorem 1, where we have the set of
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(Ra, Rl) pairs satisfying
Ra ≤ I(S;Y )
Rl ≥ I(S;Z)
over all possible p(x|s). For the coded region, we simulate a sub-region of the one given in Theorem 1, where we
set U = Y and achieve the set of (Ra, Rl) pairs satisfying
Ra ≤ min{H(S), H(Y )}
Rl ≥ I(Y, S;Z) = H(Z)−H(N)
over all possible p(x|s). For converse arguments, we consider the outer-bound region given by the set of (Ra, Rl)
pairs satisfying
Ra ≤ min{H(S), I(X,S;Y ) = H(Y )}
Rl ≥ I(S;Z)
over all possible p(x|s). This outer-bound region follows from Proposition 6. We evaluate the regions above in
terms of the channel parameters as follows. Let Pr{X = 1} = α. Then,
H(S) = H(p, q, r),
H(Y |S) = rH(α)
H(Y ) = H(q + rα)
H(Z|S) = (p+ q)H(n) + rH(α⊗ n)
H(Z) = H((q + rα) ⊗ n),
where H(·, ·, ·) is the ternary entropy function, H(·) is the binary entropy function, and ⊗ is the binary convolution
given by p ⊗ q = p(1 − q) + q(1 − p). The numerical results are given in Fig. 3. The regions are truncated with
Rl ≤ H(S) as any Rl > H(S) is trivially achievable. We note that, the coded region is potentially larger than its
uncoded counterparts even when we only compute a subset of the coded achievable region. This shows the gains
that can be leveraged by the proposed scheme, i.e., sending a refinement of the state sequence over the channel.
V. GAUSSIAN SCENARIO
Consider the channels given by
Yi = Xi + Si +Ni
Zi = Xi + Si + N˜i,
where the state and noise distributions are generated i.i.d. as Si ∼ N (0, σ2s), Ni ∼ N (0, σ2n), N˜i ∼ N (0, σ2nz), and
the cost constraint on the channel input is given by c(x) = x2 and C = P , i.e., 1
n
n∑
i=1
E{X2i } ≤ P. (See Fig. 4.)
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Fig. 3. Simulation results for memory with defective cells model.
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Zi
Fig. 4. The channel model for the Gaussian setting. Si ∼ N (0, σ2s), Ni ∼ N (0, σ2n), and N˜i ∼ N (0, σ2nz ).
A. An inner bound for C using an uncoded scheme
The inner bound is based on sending an amplified version of S together with some additional Gaussian noise.
This uncoded signal is constructed as follows.
Xi = ρ
σx
σs
Si +
√
(1− ρ2)σxTi, (11)
where Ti ∼ N (0, 1) independent of Si, ρ ∈ [−1, 1], and σ2x ≤ P . Here, ρ2 is the fraction of the power allocated
to Si. This scheme achieves the following region.
Theorem 11: The uncoded scheme, which forwards Si at each time step together with some i.i.d. Gaussian noise
as given in (11), achieves the set of (Ra, Rl) pairs denoted by the region Runcoded, where
Runcoded = Convex Hull


⋃
ρ∈[−1,1],σ2x∈[0,P ]
(Ra(ρ, σx), Rl(ρ, σx))

 ⊂ C,
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with
Ra(ρ, σx) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + ρ
2σ2x
σ2n + (1− ρ2)σ2x
)
(12)
Rl(ρ, σx) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + ρ
2σ2x
σ2nz + (1− ρ2)σ2x
)
. (13)
The expressions above are obtained by evaluating Ra = I(S;Y ) and Rl = I(S;Z) on account of uncoded
transmission in (11).
Examples:
• If P ≥ σ2s , one can set X = −S and achieve the pair
(Ra = 0, Rl = 0).
• Another trivial point is obtained by setting X = 0, which achieves(
Ra =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s
σ2n
)
, Rl =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s
σ2nz
))
.
B. Outer-bounds on C
Corollary 12: Let ρ denote the correlation coefficient between X and S. The set of all achievable rate pairs
(Ra, Rl), satisfy
Ra ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + σ
2
x + 2ρσsσx
σ2n
)
Rl ≥ 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + ρ
2σ2x + 2ρσsσx
σ2nz + σ
2
x(1− ρ2)
)
for −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and σ2x ≤ P .
Proof: Using Proposition 7, we have
Ra ≤ I(X,S;Y ) = h(Y )− h(Y |X,S) = h(Y )− h(N) ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + σ
2
x
σ2n
)
. (14)
Using Proposition 7, the linear estimate Sˆ(Z) = E[SZ]
E[Z2]Z , and the fact the conditioning does not increase entropy,
we get
Rl ≥ I(S;Z,U) ≥ I(S;Z) = h(S)− h(S|Z) = h(S)− h(S − Sˆ(Z)|Z) ≥ h(S)− h(S − Sˆ(Z)).
Since the entropy maximizing distribution for a given second moment is a Gaussian, we have
h(S − Sˆ(Z)) ≤ 1
2
log 2πe

 σ2s
1 +
σ2s+2ρσsσx+ρ
2σ2x
σ2nz+σ
2
x(1−ρ2)

 ,
leading to
Rl ≥ 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + ρ
2σ2x
σ2nz + σ
2
x(1− ρ2)
)
.
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Corollary 13: Let ρ denote the correlation coefficient between X and S. If σ2n ≤ σ2nz , then the set of all
achievable rate pairs (Ra, Rl) satisfy
Ra −Rl ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + σ
2
x
σ2n
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + σ
2
x
σ2nz
)
, (15)
for −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and σ2x ≤ P .
Proof: By Proposition 7, we have
Ra −Rl ≤ I(X,S;Y |Z).
Without loss of generality, we consider N˜ = N +N ′ with σ2nz = σ
2
n+ σ
2
n′ where N ′ is independent of N . Noting
that,
I(X,S;Y |Z) = h(Y |Z)− h(Y |X,S, Z) = h(Y |Z)− h(N |N˜),
we upper bound h(Y |Z) using the following. Consider two zero-mean correlated random variables A and B.
h(A|B) (a)= h(A− Aˆ(B)|B)
≤ h(A− Aˆ(B))
(b)
≤ 1
2
log(2πeσ2e),
where in (a) we used Aˆ(B) as the estimate of A given B, and (b) follows by defining the estimation error variance
σ2e , E
[
(A− Aˆ(B))2
]
and the fact that Gaussian distribution maximizes entropy given the variance. We then
upper bound the optimal estimator error variance by the linear MMSE variance. Therefore,
h(A|B) ≤ 1
2
log
(
2πe
(
var(A) − E
[
(AB)2
]
var(B)
))
.
Using the above, we obtain
Ra −Rl ≤ 1
2
log
(
2πe
(
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + σ
2
x + σ
2
n −
(σ2s + 2ρσsσx + σ
2
x + σ
2
n)
2
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + σ
2
x + σ
2
n + σ
2
n′
))
− 1
2
log
(
2πe
(
σ2n −
(σ2n)
2
σ2n + σ
2
n′
))
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + σ
2
x
σ2n
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + 2ρσsσx + σ
2
x
σ2n + σ
2
n′
)
. (16)
This completes the proof.
C. Comparison of inner and outer bounds for the degraded Gaussian channel
We now compare the uncoded scheme and the outer bound presented above. In particular, we show that the
uncoded transmission scheme achieves certain corner points of the amplification-masking region and that the gap
between the inner and outer bounds on the region is within 1/2 bits for a wide set of channel parameters. We also
show that the uncoded scheme achieves the optimal difference Ra −Rl.
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1) Characterization of the gap between achievable and converse regions: We show that given any point (Ra, Rl)
in the converse region corresponding to a given (ρ, σx), uncoded transmission achieves within 1/2 bits of the con-
verse region under certain conditions on channel parameters. In particular, for any given Ra, uncoded transmission
achieves that Ra and within 1/2 bits of the bound on Rl if Pσ2nz ≤ 1. Similarly for any given Rl, uncoded
transmission achieves the given Rl and within 1/2 bits of the bound on Ra if Pσ2n ≤ 1. We prove these as follows.
Using Corollary 12, any point in the outer bound region is described as
Ra =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + σ
2
x + 2ρσsσx
σ2n
)
Rl =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + ρ
2σ2x + 2ρσsσx
σ2nz + σ
2
x(1− ρ2)
)
(17)
for −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and σ2x ≤ P . Now let us show that uncoded transmission achieves any Rl in the region above and
the gap from Ra as above is within 1/2 bits. Let the uncoded scheme be designed such that Xi = σxσs ρSi + Ti,
where Ti ∼ N (0, σ2x(1 − ρ2)) and independent of Si. Now, by (13) and (12) this input achieves a leakage,
I(S;Z) = 12 log
(
1 +
σ2s+ρ
2σ2x+2ρσsσx
σ2nz+σ
2
x(1−ρ2)
)
and Ra given by I(S;Y ) = 12 log
(
1 +
σ2s+ρ
2σ2x+2ρσsσx
σ2n+σ
2
x(1−ρ2)
)
, which implies
that the gap is given by
I(X,S;Y )− I(S;Y ) = I(X ;Y |S) = 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2x(1 − ρ2)
σ2n
)
≤ 1
2
, (18)
for P
σ2n
≤ 1. Now, in order to prove the other claim, that uncoded achieves any given Ra and the gap with Rl is
within 1/2 bits, we proceed as follows. Given Ra = 12 log
(
1 +
σ2s+σ
2
x+2ρσsσx
σ2n
)
, we achieve this by choosing an
uncoded scheme such that Xi = σx′σs Si if ρ ≥ 0 or Xi = −
σx′
σs
Si if ρ < 0. We choose σx′ such that
σ2x′ + 2
ρ
|ρ|σsσx′ = σ
2
x + 2ρσsσx, if ρ 6= 0,
σ2x′ + 2σsσx′ = σ
2
x, if ρ = 0,
where 0 ≤ σx′ ≤
√
P . By the intermediate value theorem for continuous functions, it is clear that there exists
σx′ ≤
√
P such that the conditions above are satisfied. Further, the uncoded scheme achieves the desired Ra. For
ρ 6= 0, the scheme achieves an Rl given by 12 log
(
1 +
σ2s+σ
2
x′
+2 ρ
|ρ|
σsσx′
σ2nz
)
leading to a gap
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + σ
2
x′ + 2
ρ
|ρ|σsσx′
σ2nz
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + ρ
2σ2x + 2ρσsσx
σ2nz + σ
2
x(1− ρ2)
)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + σ
2
x + 2ρσsσx
σ2nz
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2s + ρ
2σ2x + 2ρσsσx
σ2nz + σ
2
x(1− ρ2)
)
=
1
2
log
(
σ2nz + σ
2
s + σ
2
x + 2ρσsσx
σ2nz
)
− 1
2
log
(
σ2nz + σ
2
s + σ
2
x + 2ρσsσx
σ2nz + σ
2
x(1− ρ2)
)
=
1
2
log
(
σ2nz + σ
2
x(1− ρ2)
σ2nz
)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2x(1− ρ2)
σ2nz
)
≤ 1
2
log 2 =
1
2
, (19)
when P
σ2nz
≤ 1. Following the same steps, ρ = 0 case can be shown as well, implying the characterization of the
trade-off region within 1/2 bits for P
σ2nz
≤ 1 and P
σ2n
≤ 1.
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Fig. 5. Simulation results for the Gaussian scenario.
2) Differential amplification capacity: Note that the uncoded transmission achieves the maximum Ra−Rl. The
upper bound on Ra −Rl in (15) is maximized for σ2x = P and ρ = 1. This maximum difference between Ra and
Rl is achieved by uncoded transmission corresponding to X =
√
P
σs
S in Theorem 11, and is given by
Cd =
1
2
log
(
1 +
(σs +
√
P )2
σ2n
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
(σs +
√
P )2
σ2nz
)
.
3) Corner points of the trade-off region: Consider the corner points of the amplification-masking region. Inspect-
ing (14), we observe that the point in the outer bound region corresponding to maximum amplification is given by
ρ = 1. Clearly, from (18) and (19), we see that the gap is zero for ρ = 1. Similarly, consider the point corresponding
to minimum leakage Rl in the weak and moderate interference regimes as in [9]. These points correspond to ρ = −1
and we have I(X,S;Y ) = I(S;Y ) and I(X,S;Z) = I(S;Z), leading to the gap being zero. This is also verified
by setting ρ = −1 in (18) and (19).
4) Numerical results: We compare the uncoded region with an outer-bound region (given in Proposition 12) in
Fig. 5. The first case corresponds to a degraded scenario, where the gap between the regions is fairly small as
expected from the analysis given above. However, for the reversely degraded scenario with larger power constraint
P compared to the state power σ2s , the gap is larger. In Fig. 6, we plot the differential amplification capacity for a
degraded channel (σ2n = 1, σ2nz = 5) for a range of power constraints P and different values of σ2s . Note that the
differential amplification capacity saturates in the high SNR regime, and the effect of encoder in increasing Cd is
decreasing as the power of the additive state increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
We study the problem of state amplification under the masking constraints, where the encoder (with the knowledge
of non-causal state Sn) facilitates the amplification rate ( 1
n
I(Sn;Y n)) at Bob, which observes Y n, while minimizing
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Fig. 6. Differential amplification capacity Cd vs. power P (dB). The dashed curve with diamond markers correspond to the same scenario
given in the degraded setting of Fig. 5 (σ2s = 10) for different power levels.
the leakage rate ( 1
n
I(Sn;Zn)) as much as possible at Eve, which observes Zn. Our coding schemes are based
on transmission of state dependent messages over the state dependent channel to Bob. The achievable region
corresponding to this refinement strategy is derived by calculating bounds on amplification and masking rates.
We also show that for the input distributions enabling Bob to be a “stronger” receiver than Eve, the refinement
information can be sent securely over the channel. This secure refinement approach is shown to lead to non-
trivial achievable regions. We also provided outer bounds, using which we showed that the scheme without secure
refinement achieves the optimal Ra − Rl over the region in the reversely degraded DMCs, the degraded binary
channels, and Gaussian channels. For the degraded Gaussian model, we also characterized the optimal corner points,
and the gap between the outer bound and achievable regions.
Several interesting problems can be considered as future directions. First, the channel cost may be introduced
for the DMC model as well, and the cost may have some dependence on the state sequence or vary according to
a stochastic model. Second, causal channel state knowledge can be considered. Third, in addition to the task of
state amplification and masking, transmission of messages to the receivers can be considered. Towards this end,
signaling techniques for (secure) broadcast channel models can be utilized. Another extension direction is the coded
state sequence setting [45], which is a scenario that is more relevant to the broadcast and cognitive radio systems,
where the coded signal (that carries a message from a codebook) corresponds to the channel state sequence that is
non-causally known at the encoder. Finally, a source coding extension of the current model can be studied. In such
a problem setup, the trade-off between the distortions achieved at both users can be analyzed. A relevant work for
such an extension is [46], where a source coding setup is considered with two sources (one has to be amplified and
the other has to be masked) with a single receiver. We remark that the amplification and leakage rates analyzed
in this paper can be utilized to provide a lower bound on the distortion that can be achieved at Bob and Eve,
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respectively, by evaluating the corresponding distortion-rate functions.
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APPENDIX A
Pr{Ec3 ∩ E4} → 0 AS n→∞
We use the arguments given in [40] in order to show this. Similar to the joint source-channel coding scenario
studied in [40], we have a codeword Un with a covering index K , which makes the codebook and covering index K
dependent to each other. In other words, Sn sequence realization together with the codebook determines the index
K , from which (Sn, Un) generates Y n through an i.i.d. generation process. Under such a scenario, as reported
in [40], decoding the index K with Y n at receiver is successful if the number of K indices is less than 2nI(U ;Y ).
We now provide this analysis here for completeness. Using the steps given in [40] for the scenario here, we have
the following: For a given M , we have 2nRk number of Un(M,k) codewords (k ∈ [1 : 2nRk ]), and the bound
below.
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Pr{Ec3 ∩ E4} = Pr{(Un(M,k), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ for some k 6= K}
(a)
≤
2nRk∑
k=1
Pr{(Un(M,k), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ ,K 6= k}
=
2nRk∑
k=1
∑
sn
p(sn) Pr{(Un(M,k), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ ,K 6= k|Sn = sn}
(b)
= 2nRk
∑
sn
p(sn) Pr{(Un(M, 1), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ ,K 6= 1|Sn = sn}
≤ 2nRk
∑
sn
p(sn) Pr{(Un(M, 1), Y n) ∈ T (n)ǫ |K 6= 1, Sn = sn}
= 2nRk
∑
sn
p(sn)
∑
(un,yn)∈T (n)ǫ
Pr{Un(M, 1) = un, Y n = yn|K 6= 1, Sn = sn}
(c)
= 2nRk
∑
sn
p(sn)
∑
(un,yn)∈T (n)ǫ
∑
C¯
Pr{Un(M, 1) = un, Y n = yn|K 6= 1, Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯}
× Pr{C¯ = C¯|K 6= 1, Sn = sn}
(d)
= 2nRk
∑
sn
p(sn)
∑
(un,yn)∈T (n)ǫ
∑
C¯
Pr{Un(M, 1) = un|K 6= 1, Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯}
× Pr{Y n = yn|K 6= 1, Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯}Pr{C¯ = C¯|K 6= 1, Sn = sn}
(e)
≤ 2nRk
∑
sn
p(sn)
∑
(un,yn)∈T (n)ǫ
∑
C¯
2Pr{Un(M, 1) = un}
× Pr{Y n = yn|K 6= 1, Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯}Pr{C¯ = C¯|K 6= 1, Sn = sn}
= 2nRk
∑
sn
p(sn)
∑
(un,yn)∈T (n)ǫ
2Pr{Un(M, 1) = un}Pr{Y n = yn|K 6= 1, Sn = sn}
(f)
≤ 2nRk
∑
sn
p(sn)
∑
(un,yn)∈T (n)ǫ
4Pr{Un(M, 1) = un}Pr{Y n = yn|Sn = sn}
(g)
= 2nRk+2
∑
(un,yn)∈T (n)ǫ
n∏
i=1
pU (ui) Pr{Y n = yn}
(h)
≤ 2n(Rk−I(U ;Y )+δ)
where (a) is due to the union of events bound, and (b) follows by the symmetry of the codebook generation and
coding, (c) is by defining C¯ = {Un(M,k), k 6= 1}, (d) is due to the fact that given K 6= 1, Un(M, 1)→ (C¯, Sn)→
Y n forms a Markov chain, (e) is due to Lemma 14 given at the end of this section, (f) is due to Lemma 15 given
at the end of this section, (g) is due to having i.i.d. generation for Un, i.e., Pr{Un(M, 1) = un} =
n∏
i=1
pU (ui), (h)
is due to joint typicality lemma [39].
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From the last expression, we obtain that Pr{Ec3 ∩ E4} → 0 as n → ∞, if Rk < I(U ;Y ) − δ. This implies the
existence of sequence of codes implying the desired result as we set Rk = I(U ;S) + δ < I(U ;Y )− δ.
Lemma 14 (Lemma 1 in [40]): For sufficiently large n, Pr{Un(M, 1) = un|K 6= 1, Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯} ≤
2Pr{Un(M, 1) = un}
Proof: We have
Pr{Un(M, 1) = un|K 6= 1, Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯} = Pr{Un(M, 1) = un|Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯}
× Pr{K 6= 1|U
n(M, 1) = un, Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯}
Pr{K 6= 1|Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯}
(a)
≤ Pr{U
n(M, 1) = un}
Pr{K 6= 1|Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯}
(b)
≤ 2Pr{Un(M, 1) = un}
where (a) is due to independence of Un(M, 1) and (Sn, C¯) together with bounding Pr{K 6= 1|Un(M, 1) =
un, Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯} ≤ 1, and (b) follows from Pr{K 6= 1|Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯} ≥ 12 , as shown below.
Consider t = t(C¯, sn) = |{un(M,k) ∈ C¯ : (un(M,k), sn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ }|. Then, if t ≥ 1, by the symmetry of the
codebook generation and coding,
Pr{K = 1|Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯} = Pr{(U
n(M, 1), sn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ }
t+ 1
≤ 1
t+ 1
≤ 1
2
,
where we upper bound the probability with 1 and used t ≥ 1. On the other hand, if t = 0, for sufficiently large n,
and due to the symmetry of the codebook generation and coding, we have
Pr{K = 1|Sn = sn, C¯ = C¯} ≤ Pr{(Un(M, 1), sn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ }+
Pr{(Un(M, 1), sn) /∈ T (n)ǫ′ }
2nRk
≤ Pr{(Un(M, 1), sn) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ }+
1
2nRk
≤ 2−n(I(U ;S)−δ(ǫ′)) + 1
2nRk
≤ 1
2
,
where bound the probability with 1 and utilized the joint typicality lemma [39]. The last inequality holds in the
limit of large n as Rk > 0 and I(U ;S) > δ(ǫ′), where δ(ǫ′)→ 0 as ǫ′ → 0.
Lemma 15 (Lemma 2 in [40]): For sufficiently large n, Pr{Y n = yn|K 6= 1, Sn = sn} ≤ 2Pr{Y n = yn|Sn =
sn}
Proof: We have
Pr{Y n = yn|K 6= 1, Sn = sn} = Pr{Y
n = yn|Sn = sn}Pr{K 6= 1|Sn = sn, Y n = yn}
Pr{K 6= 1|Sn = sn}
(a)
≤ Pr{Y
n = yn|Sn = sn}
Pr{K 6= 1|Sn = sn}
(b)
≤ 2Pr{Y n = yn|Sn = sn},
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where (a) follows as Pr{K 6= 1|Sn = sn, Y n = yn} ≤ 1, and (b) is due to having Pr{K 6= 1|Sn = sn} ≥ 1/2
for sufficiently large n due to the symmetry of the codebook generation and coding.
APPENDIX B
INDICATOR EVENT CONDITIONING LEMMA
Lemma 16: Consider an indicator random variable E, where E = 1 for E , and E = 0 for Ec, for an event E .
Then, for any A,B,
H(A|B) ≤ H(A|B,E) + 1
I(A;B) ≥ I(A;B|E) − 1
I(A;B) ≤ I(A;B|E) + 1
Proof:
H(A|B)
(a)
≤ H(A|B) +H(E|B,A) = H(E|B) +H(A|B,E)
(b)
≤ H(A|B,E) + 1 (20)
I(A;B)
(c)
≥ H(A|E)−H(A|B)
(d)
≥ I(A;B|E) − 1
I(A;B)
(c)
≤ H(A)−H(A|B,E)
(e)
≤ I(A;B|E) + 1,
where (a) is due to H(E|B,E) ≥ 0, (b) is due to upper bound on the entropy of a binary random variable, (c)
follows as conditioning does not increase entropy, (d) follows by (20), and (e) follows by considering B = ∅ in
(20) to upper bound H(A).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: We first consider I(U ;Z) > I(U ;S) case, for which the codewords are represented by Un(M,T,K).
I(M ;Zn) = H(M)−H(M |Zn)
= H(M)−H(T,K,Zn,M) +H(Zn) +H(T,K|Zn,M)
= H(Zn) +H(T,K|Zn,M)−H(T,K|M)−H(Zn|M,T,K)
(a)
≤ n(H(Z) + ǫ1)−H(T |M)−H(Un|M,T )−H(Zn|M,T, Un)
(b)
= n(H(Z|U) + I(U ;S) + ǫ2)−H(Un, Zn|M,T )
= n(H(Z|U) + I(U ;S) + ǫ2)−H(Un, Zn|M,T, Sn)− I(Sn;Un, Zn|M,T )
(c)
≤ n(H(Z|U) + I(U ;S) + ǫ2)−H(Zn|M,T, Sn, Un)−H(Sn|M,T ) +H(Sn|Un, Zn)
(d)
≤ n(I(S;Z,U) + ǫ2)−H(Sn|M,T ) +H(Sn|Un, Zn),
where (a) follows by H(Zn) =
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Zi−11 ) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Zi) = nH(Z), H(T,K|Zn,M) ≤ nǫ1 for some ǫ1 → 0
as n → ∞ (this is decoding of (T,K) at eavesdropper having (Zn,M), following from steps similar to the
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proof of Theorem 1 replacing Bob with Eve, as number of (T,K) indices is 2n(I(U ;Z)−δ), see also Appendix A),
H(K|M,T ) = H(Un|M,T ), and having H(Zn|M,T,K) = H(Zn|M,T, Un) as (M,T,K) is a one-to-one
function of (M,T, Un(M,T,K)), (b) follows by H(T |M) = H(T ) = n(I(U ;Z) − I(U ;S) − 2δ) as T is
independent of M and uniformly random and taking ǫ2 = ǫ1 + 2δ, (c) follows as H(Un|M,T, Sn) ≥ 0 and
H(Sn|M,T, Un, Zn) = H(Sn|Un, Zn) as (M,T ) uniquely determined given Un(M,T,K), (d) is by having
H(Zn|M,T, Sn, Un) =
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Zi−11 ,M, T, Sn, Un) =
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Si, Ui) = nH(Z|S,U),
which is due to the Markov chain (Zi−11 ,M, T, S
i−1
1 , S
n
i+1, U
i−1
1 , U
n
i+1) → (Si, Ui) → Zi as (Ui, Si) generates
(Xi, Si) which generates Zi i.i.d. due to the memoryless channel.
Secondly, consider I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;S) case, for which the codewords are represented by Un(M,K). We consider
K = [K1,K2] with K1 = [1 : 2n(I(U ;S)−I(U ;Z)+2δ)] and K2 = [1 : 2n(I(U ;Z)−δ)], which together represent the
covering index K . (This can be obtained via random binning of 2n(I(U ;S)+δ) number of codewords Un(M,k),
k ∈ [1 : 2n(I(U ;S)+δ)], into bins represented by k1, where the codeword index per bin represented by k2.) We
continue as follows.
I(M ;Zn) = H(M)−H(M |Zn)
= H(M)−H(M,K1,K2, Zn) +H(Zn) +H(K1,K2|Zn,M)
= H(Zn) +H(K1|Zn,M) +H(K2|Zn,M,K1)−H(K1,K2|M)−H(Zn|M,K1,K2)
(a)
≤ n(H(Z|U) + I(U ;S) + ǫ2)−H(Un|M)−H(Zn|M,Un)
= n(H(Z|U) + I(U ;S) + ǫ2)−H(Un, Zn|M)
= n(H(Z|U) + I(U ;S) + ǫ2)−H(Un, Zn|M,Sn)− I(Sn;Un, Zn|M)
(b)
≤ n(H(Z|U) + I(U ;S) + ǫ2)−H(Zn|M,Sn, Un)−H(Sn|M) +H(Sn|Un, Zn)
(c)
≤ n(I(S;Z,U) + ǫ2)−H(Sn|M) +H(Sn|Un, Zn),
where (a) follows by having H(Zn) ≤ nH(Z) as described above, H(K1|Zn,M) ≤ H(K1) ≤ n(I(U ;S) −
I(U ;Z) + 2δ), H(K2|Zn,M,K1) ≤ nǫ1 for some ǫ1 → 0 as n → ∞ (this is decoding of K2 at eavesdropper
having (Zn,M,K1), following from steps similar to the proof of Theorem 1 replacing Bob with Eve, as number
of K2 indices is 2n(I(U ;Z)−δ), see also Appendix A), H(K1,K2|M) = H(Un|M), having H(Zn|M,K1,K2) =
H(Zn|M,K1,K2, Un) as Un(M,K1,K2) is determined by (M,K1,K2), and defining ǫ2 = 2δ + ǫ1, (b) is by
H(Un|M,Sn) ≥ 0, and (c) is same as that of the step (d) of the previous paragraph.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
From Lemma 3, we have
I(M ;Zn) ≤ nI(S;Z,U) +H(Sn|Un, Zn)−H(Sn|M,T ) + nǫ.
Here, H(Sn|Un, Zn) =
n∑
i=1
H(Si|Si−11 , Un, Zn) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Si|Ui, Zi) = nH(S|U,Z). In addition, as Sn is
generated i.i.d., and also independent of (M,T ), we have H(Sn|M,T ) = H(Sn) ≥ n(H(S) − ǫ1) with some
ǫ1 → 0 as n → ∞. (The latter expression follows as we can bound H(Sn) ≥ H(Sn|E) where E is an indicator
random variable with E = 1 if Sn is typical. Then, H(Sn|E) = Pr{E = 0}H(Sn|E = 0)+Pr{E = 1}H(Sn|E =
1) ≥ Pr{E = 1}H(Sn|E = 1) ≥ (1 − ǫ0)n(H(S) − ǫ0) for some arbitrarily small ǫ0, from which the assertion
follows by taking ǫ1 = ǫ0(1 +H(S)− ǫ0).) Then, using these two observations in the equation above, we obtain
I(M ;Zn) ≤ nI(S;Z,U) + nH(S|U,Z)− nH(S) + nǫ1 + nǫ = n(ǫ1 + ǫ), which concludes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Proof: Define a random variable Q uniform over {1, · · · , n} and independent of everything else. (A standard
technique of using Q as a time sharing parameter will be utilized in the following.) Also define Ui = (Si−11 , Zni+1).
We have the following bounds.
I(Sn;Y n) ≤ I(Xn, Sn;Y n)
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Si;Yi)
(b)
= nI(XQ, SQ;YQ|Q)
(c)
≤ nI(UQ, Q,XQ, SQ;YQ) (21)
where (a) is due to the memoryless channel p(yi|xi, si) and the fact that conditioning does not increase the entropy,
(b) follows from the distribution of Q, (c) follows as the added term I(Q;YQ) + I(UQ;YQ|Q,XQ, SQ) ≥ 0. In
addition,
I(Sn;Y n) ≤ H(Sn)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Si|Si−11 )
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Si)
= nH(SQ|Q), (22)
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where (a) holds as Sn has an i.i.d. distribution. Moreover,
I(Sn;Zn) = H(Sn)−H(Sn|Zn)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Si)−H(Si|Si−11 , Zn)
(a)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Si)−H(Si|Zi, Si−11 , Zni+1)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Si)−H(Si|Zi, Ui)
(c)
= nI(SQ;ZQ, UQ|Q), (23)
where (a) is due the fact that conditioning does not increase the entropy, (b) follows from the definition of Ui, and
(c) is the standard time sharing argument. Finally, we have
0 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1;Zi)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Si−11 , Z
n
i+1;Zi)− I(Si−11 ;Zi|Zni+1)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Si−11 , Z
n
i+1;Zi)− I(Zni+1;Si|Si−11 )
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Si−11 , Z
n
i+1;Zi)− I(Si−11 , Zni+1;Si)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Zi)− I(Ui;Si)
= n(I(UQ;ZQ|Q)− I(UQ;SQ|Q)), (24)
where (a) follows by Csisza´r’s sum lemma [39] (note that this is similar to the converse result of the Gel’fand-
Pinsker problem given in [44], where the indices of S and Z are reversed), (b) is due to I(Si−11 ;Si) = 0 as Sn
has an i.i.d. distribution, (c) follows from definition of Ui, (d) is the standard time sharing argument.
Now, define U = (UQ, Q), S = SQ independent of Q (note that this argument is also used in [9] in the
corresponding single-letterization arguments), X = XQ, Y = YQ, and Z = ZQ. Then, (21) implies I(Sn;Y n) ≤
nI(UQ, Q,XQ, SQ;YQ) ≤ nI(U,X, S;Y ) = nI(S,X ;Y ) as U → (X,S) → Y due to the memoryless channel
p(y|x, s). (22) reduces to I(Sn;Y n) ≤ nH(SQ|Q) = nH(S), as SQ = S is independent of Q. (23) implies
I(Sn;Zn) ≥ nI(SQ;ZQ, UQ, Q) = nI(S;Z,U) as I(SQ;ZQ, UQ|Q) = H(SQ|Q) − H(SQ|ZQ, UQ, Q) =
H(SQ) − H(SQ|ZQ, UQ, Q) = I(SQ;ZQ, UQ, Q) due to the independence of SQ = S and Q. (24) is 0 ≤
n(I(UQ;ZQ|Q)−I(UQ;SQ|Q)). Consider adding n(I(Q;ZQ)−I(Q;SQ)) to the right hand side of this inequality.
We have, as SQ = S and Q are independent, I(Q;SQ) = 0, and hence n(I(Q;ZQ) − I(Q;SQ)) ≥ 0. Then,
0 ≤ n(I(UQ;ZQ|Q)− I(UQ;SQ|Q)) ≤ n(I(UQ, Q;ZQ)− I(UQ, Q;SQ)) = n(I(U ;Z)− I(U ;S)), which implies
0 ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;S) as a necessary condition.
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This concludes the proof, as combining the bounds above with the fact that any achievable (Ra, Rl) for the
given channel p(y, z|x, s) and p(s) should satisfy 1
n
I(Sn;Y n) ≥ Ra − ǫ and 1nI(Sn;Zn) ≤ Rl + ǫ implies the
inequalities stated in the proposition.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof: Let P1 denote the set of p(u, x|s) satisfying I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S), and denote P2 denote the set of
p(u, x|s) satisfying I(U ;Z) ≥ I(U ;S). For the channel p(y, z|x, s) = p(y|x, s)p(z|y), any p ∈ P2 also satisfies
p ∈ P1. Therefore, using the Proposition 6, we have that if (Ra, Rl) is achievable, then (Ra, Rl) ∈ R3o, where
R3o =
⋃
p(u,x|s)
(Ra, Rl)
satisfying
Ra ≤ min {H(S), I(X,S;Y )}
Rl ≥ I(S;Z,U)
0 ≤ I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S).
It remains to show Ra − Rl bound. We add the following bound to the ones stated above. (Note that, we use
the same Ui and Q-dependent definitions stated in Appendix E, and hence the following bound can be added to
the ones stated in Appendix E.)
n(Ra −Rl) = I(Sn;Y n)− I(Sn;Zn)
= I(Xn, Sn;Y n)− I(Xn, Sn;Zn)− (I(Xn;Y n|Sn)− I(Xn;Zn|Sn))
(a)
≤ I(Xn, Sn;Y n)− I(Xn, Sn;Zn)
(b)
= I(Xn, Sn;Y n|Zn)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−11 , Zn)−
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−11 , Zn, Xn, Sn)
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Zi)−
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Zi, Xi, Si)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Si;Yi|Zi)
(d)
= nI(XQ, SQ;YQ|ZQ, Q)
(e)
≤ nI(UQ, Q,XQ, SQ;YQ|ZQ)
(f)
= nI(U,X, S;Y |Z)
(g)
= nI(X,S;Y |Z),
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where (a) and (b) are due to the degradedness condition, (c) is due to the fact that conditioning does not increase
entropy and the Markov chain (Y i−11 , Zi−11 , Zni+1, Si−11 , Sni+1, X i−11 , Xni+1) → (Xi, Si, Zi) → Yi as (Xi, Si)
generates Yi, (d) follows from the memoryless property of the channel, (d) and (f) are due to definitions given in
Appendix E, (e) is by adding the non-negative term I(Q;YQ|ZQ) + I(UQ;YQ|ZQ, Q,XQ, SQ), and (g) is due to
the Markov chain U → (X,S)→ (Y, Z) as outputs (yi, zi) are generated i.i.d. using (xi, si) over the memoryless
channel p(y, z|x, s) = p(y|x, s)p(z|y). The result then follows by taking the union over all joint distributions
p(u, x|s).
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE FOR THEOREM 8
Proof: We bound the rate difference as follows.
n(Ra −Rl) ≤ I(Sn;Y n)− I(Sn;Zn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Sn;Yi|Y i−11 )− I(Sn;Zi|Zni+1)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Sn;Yi|Y i−11 , Zni+1) + I(Zni+1;Yi|Y i−11 )− I(Zni+1;Yi|Y i−11 , Sn)
− [I(Sn;Zi|Y i−11 , Zni+1) + I(Y i−11 ;Zi|Zni+1)− I(Y i−11 ;Zi|Zni+1, Sn)]
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Sn;Yi|Y i−11 , Zni+1)− I(Sn;Zi|Y i−11 , Zni+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Si;Yi|Y i−11 , Zni+1, Si−11 , Sni+1) + I(Si−11 , Sni+1;Yi|Y i−11 , Zni+1)
−I(Si;Zi|Y i−11 , Zni+1, Si−11 , Sni+1)− I(Si−11 , Sni+1;Zi|Y i−11 , Zni+1)
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Si;Yi|Ui)− I(Si;Zi|Ui)
(d)
= n[I(S;Y |U)− I(S;Z|U)],
where, in (a), we used the equalities
I(Sn;Yi|Y i−11 ) + I(Zni+1;Yi|Y i−11 , Sn) = I(Zni+1;Yi|Y i−11 ) + I(Sn;Yi|Y i−11 , Zni+1)
and
I(Sn;Zi|Zni+1) + I(Y i−11 ;Zi|Zni+1, Sn) = I(Y i−11 ;Zi|Zni+1) + I(Sn;Zi|Zni+1, Y i−11 );
in (b), we used the Csiszar’s sum lemma [4] (and a conditional form of it) to obtain the equalities
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1;Yi|Y i−11 ) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−11 ;Zi|Zni+1)
and
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1;Yi|Y i−11 , Sn) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−11 ;Zi|Zni+1, Sn);
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in (c), we define Ui , (Y i−11 , Zni+1, Si−11 , Sni+1); and use the reversely degradedness of the channel resulting in
I(Si−11 , S
n
i+1;Zi|Y i−11 , Zni+1) ≥ I(Si−11 , Sni+1;Yi|Y i−11 , Zni+1), in (d), we obtain the single-letter expression (by
defining U = (Ui, i), etc., see, e.g., [47]). Note that, with the definition of Ui in (c), Xi is generated from Sn, and
hence from (Ui, Si). In addition, given (Xi, Si), Zi is independent of (Ui, Si). Thus, (U, S)→ (X,S)→ Z forms
a Markov chain, and the upper bound is given by
Ra −Rl ≤ max
p(u,x|s) s.t. (U,S)→(X,S)→Z
I(S;Y |U)− I(S;Z|U)
= max
p(x|u∗,s), u∗∈U
I(S;Y |U = u∗)− I(S;Z|U = u∗)
= max
p(x|s)
I(S;Y )− I(S;Z),
where the equalities follow due to the following: First, the conditional mutual information expression is maximized
with a particular input u∗ (as randomizing over different u values will not increase the sum ∑
u
(I(S;Y |U =
u)− I(S;Z|U = u))Pr{U = u})) and a probability distribution p∗(x|u∗, s). Second, the optimal p∗(x|u∗, s) will
correspond to a p(x|s). Thus, the converse result can be stated over input distributions in the form p(x|s), matching
to the achievability result.
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